The Interrelationship between Military Expenditure and External Debt: Patterns of Causation in Northern Africa Countries by Georgantopoulos, Andreas G.
264 
 
Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 
Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 264-273, Oct 2011 (ISSN: 2220-6140) 
 
The Interrelationship between Military Expenditure and External Debt: Patterns of Causation in 
Northern Africa Countries 
 
*Andreas G. Georgantopoulos, Anastasios D. Tsamis 
Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Athens, Greece 
*ageorgantos@yahoo.com 
 
Abstract: It is supported by academics and scholars that defense expenditure can significantly affect a 
country’s economic growth and in some cases it influences external debt having implications in various 
macroeconomic indicators. However, relevant empirical studies have produced contradictory evidence 
while the literature in this field remains relatively poor. In this spirit, this survey investigates the causal 
links between military expenditure and external debt for four emerging Northern Africa countries (i.e. 
Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) during the period 1988-2009. Empirical findings on the long-term 
relationship between the tested variables are based on cointegration test. The Granger Causality test 
results using Vector Auto Regression (VAR) estimates and the Error Correction Model imply that there is 
no dynamic causal link between military expenditure and external debt for Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. 
On the other hand regarding Egypt, results imply that a strong unidirectional causality exists running 
from defense expenditure to external debt. Collectively, empirical calculations show that military burden 
do not have any significant impact on most Northern Africa countries. The only exception is the case of 
Egypt; empirical results show that military expenditure robustly affect the country’s external debt. These 
are the only findings provided from this study that validate the hypothesis that military burden may be 
important in determining the evolution of debt in developing countries.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Brief Review of Northern Africa Economies: Northern Africa is the northernmost region of the African 
continent, linked by the Sahara to Sub-Saharan Africa. According to United Nations (UN) definition, 
Northern Africa is consisted by seven countries (or territories); Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, 
Tunisia, and Western Sahara. The economy of Egypt depends mainly on agriculture, media, petroleum 
exports, and tourism. Moreover workers’ remittances also play an important role since more than three 
million Egyptians are working abroad, mainly in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and various European 
countries. The government has invested in communications and physical infrastructure. Egypt has 
received U.S. foreign aid (since 1979, an average of $2.2 billion per year) and is the third-largest recipient 
of such funds from the United States following the Iraq war. However, the country’s main revenues are 
gained from tourism as well as traffic that run through the Suez Canal. The economy of Egypt is under 
rapid economic transformations, which is evidenced by recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
reports that rate Egypt as one of the top countries in the world undertaking economic reforms. Some 
major economic reformations taken by the governments since 2003 include significant reductions of 
customs and tariffs. Corporate taxes decreased from 40 percent to the current 20 percent due to a new 
taxation law implemented in 2005, resulting in a stated 100 percent increase in tax revenue by the year 
2006. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Egypt has increased considerably in the past few years, 
exceeding 6 billion U.S. dollars in 2006, due to the recent economic liberalization and privatization 
measures. The Egyptian Armed forces have combined troop strength of around 450,000 active personnel. 
The United States of America provide an annual military assistance, which in 2009 amounted to 1.3 
billion U.S. dollars (inflation adjusted US$ 1.33 billion in 2011).  
 
On the other hand, the economy of Tunisia depends mainly on agriculture, mining, manufacturing, 
petroleum products and tourism. In 2008 Tunisia had a GDP of 41 billion U.S. dollars. The country also 
has one of Africa and the Middle East's highest per-capita GDPs (PPP). The agricultural sector stands for 
11.6 percent of the GDP, industry 25.7 percent, and services 62.8 percent. The industrial sector remains at 
a moderate level mainly depending on clothing manufacturing, production of car parts and electric 
machinery. Although Tunisia managed an average 5 percent growth during the 2000’s, it continues to 
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suffer from high unemployment rates especially among youth. The European Union is by far Tunisia’s 
first trading partner, currently accounting for 72.5 percent of Tunisian imports and 75 percent of 
Tunisian exports. Moreover, the country is a distinguished EU’s trading partner ranking 30th in the 
relevant list of EU’s largest trading partners. The military forces of Tunisia consist of 27,000 personnel 
equipped with 84 main battle tanks and 48 light tanks. The navy numbers 4,800 personnel, 25 patrol 
boats and 6 other craft. The air force has 4,000 personnel, 27 combat aircraft and 43 helicopters. In 
addition, paramilitary forces consisted of a 12,000-member national guard (Hackett, 2008). 
 
Regarding Algeria, the country’s economy is mostly relied on the petroleum refining sector, accounting 
for roughly 60 percent of budget revenues, 30 percent of GDP, and over 95 percent of export earnings. 
Ranking 14th in petroleum reserves (i.e. 11.8 billion barrels) the country is considered a major energy 
producer. During the mid-1990’s Algeria enjoys rapid economic growth, mainly due to structural 
reformations supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and debt rescheduling from the Paris 
Club. In the early 2000’s, the economy of Algeria benefited from an increase in oil prices and the 
government's tight fiscal policy, leading to a large increase in the trade surplus, record highs in foreign 
exchange reserves, and reduction in foreign debt. The government of Algeria strived to diversify the 
economy by attracting FDI to sectors other than the energy sector. Nevertheless, these efforts have had 
little success in reducing high unemployment and improving living standards. In 2001, the government 
along with the European Union signed the Association Treaty, which eventually lowered tariffs and 
stimulated trade. In March 2006, Russia agreed to erase $4.74 billion of Algeria's Soviet-era debt. Algeria 
also decided in 2006 to pay off its full 8 billion U.S. dollars debt to the Paris Club group of rich creditor 
nations before schedule. These tactics reduced the Algerian foreign debt to less than 5 billion U.S. dollars 
in the end of 2006. According to Hackett (2008) total military personnel include 147,000 active, 150,000 
reserve, and 187,000 paramilitary staff. The total military expenditure in 2006 was estimated variously at 
2.7 percent of GDP (3,096 million), or 3.3 percent of GDP. The former Soviet Union and the Republic of 
China has been its primary military supplier. 
 
Morocco's economy is considered a relatively globalized economy. Since 1993, the country has followed a 
privatization policy of certain economic sectors which used to be in the hands of the government. 
Government reforms and steady yearly growth in the region of 4–5% from 2000 to 2007 helped the 
Morocco’s economy to become much more robust compared to the recent past. Economic growth is far 
more diversified, with new service and industrial centers, like Casablanca and Tangier, developing. The 
agriculture sector is being rehabilitated. In combination with good rainfalls, agriculture led to a growth of 
over 20 percent in 2009, consisting it one of the country’s major resources, along with phosphates and 
tourism. Industry and mining contribute about one-third of the annual GDP. Morocco is the world's third-
largest producer of phosphorus and the price fluctuations of phosphates on the international market 
greatly influence Morocco's economy. Compulsory military service in Morocco has been suppressed since 
September 2006, and the country’s reserve obligation lasts until age 50. Morocco’s military consists of the 
Royal Armed Forces, a small navy and air force and the Auxiliary Forces. Internal security is generally 
effective, while acts of political violence are rare. 
 
Military Expenditures and External Debt in Northern Africa Countries: According to Dunne et al. 
(2004), the relationship between military expenditures and external debt can be of two forms. As a 
budget item, military expenditure creates the need for funding. If a rise in military expenditure cannot be 
financed through taxation, it creates a deficit which may be financed in four different ways: (i) printing 
money, (ii) using foreign exchange reserves, (iii) borrowing abroad or (iv) borrowing domestically.  
However, each of these methods has some limits and implications, which are widely discussed in the 
literature and, while interrelated, are associated with particular macroeconomic imbalances: printing 
money with inflation; using foreign reserves with the onset of exchange crises; foreign borrowing with an 
external debt crisis (Fischer and Easterly, 1990). High public sector deficits relative to GDP, therefore, 
potentially create a need for foreign borrowing and external debt accumulation, particularly when the 
means to finance deficits domestically is limited. 
 
Hence, there is a possibility of a relatively close relation between the deficits and foreign borrowing in 
developing countries, where the ability of using tax revenues to finance public expenditures is likely to be 
limited, money creation is likely to have already been misused, financial markets are relatively thin and 
domestic borrowing possibilities are relatively restricted (Dunne et al. 2004). A component of military 




























there seems to be a lack of foreign exchange, the economy will need to obtain it from external sources, 
usually by borrowing. It is also possible that depreciations in the currency could lead to increases in 
foreign exchange requirements. 
 
The key question in analyzing the effect of military expenditure on debt then, is how such expenditure is 
financed. If it is through higher tax revenues or lower government spending in other areas, it will not 
create a deficit; if higher military spending does create a deficit, this may or may not be financed through 
external debt. In the case of arms imports, the question is whether they can be funded through export 
earnings or existing reserves, or whether they require new credit. Figure 1 illustrates the trends in 
military burden as a percentage of GDP for the sample of four Northern Africa countries, during the 
period 1988-2009.  In the late 1980’s Egypt presents by far the highest military expenditure to GDP ratio 
followed by Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. However, this high rate tends to decrease throughout the years 
and most Northern Africa countries seem to converge in the range between 2.4% and 4.2%. Tunisia, 
historically presents the lowest defense to GDP ratio during the whole tested period starting from 2.3% in 
1988 and steadily declining since then.  
 



















Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and World Bank Indicators  
 
On the other hand, Egypt also presents the highest external debt to GDP ratio in the late 1980’s (i.e. 132 
percent of GDP in 1988) as shown in Figure 2 followed by Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. However, during 
the tested period this ratio shows a downward trend for most tested countries except Tunisia, where it 
remains in the range between 60-80 percent of GDP with Egypt and Algeria having the most impressive 
external debt reductions achieved.   
 




















Source: World Bank Indicators (World Bank Database) 
 
In this spirit, the central objective of this study is to investigate the causal links between military 
expenditures and external debt for four emerging Northern Africa economies (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco). This paper is motivated by a number of factors. First, there are no other published studies 
investigating the presence of interdependence between military burden and external debt for these 
Northern Africa countries to the best of our knowledge. Second, it enriches the very few existing 
literature on the causal links between defense expenditure and external debt. Third, it covers a period, 
which includes some of the most important macroeconomic and political transformations leading to more 
open and therefore more globalized and modern economies for Northern Africa countries. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature. Section 3, presents the data and 
methodology employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while concluding remarks with some 
policy implications are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There is a lack of literature covering the impact of military burden on developing country debt. Brzoska 
(1983) Looney (1987, 1989, 1998), Dunne et al. (2004), Feridun (2005) have attempted to investigate the 
potential effect of military spending on developing country debt, and provided some useful initial 
findings, having the need to understand better the dynamics within the individual countries as a central 
objective of their study. The results present contradictory evidence. Collectively, most studies do tend to 
show an insignificant or negative impact between the two macroeconomic variables (Dunne, 1996).  
 
Furthermore, surveys investigating the interdependence between military expenditure and external debt 
are even more limited. It is suggested by some authors, starting with Brzoska (1983), that military 
expenditure is a key variable in explaining the rise of foreign debt in a number of developing countries, 
indicating that this has led to reduced economic growth. Looney and Frederiksen (1986) concluded that 
the impact of high external borrowing due to defense spending on a country’s overall growth 
performance and resource allocation depends on the country’s capacity for international borrowing. 
Looney (1989) and Looney and Frederiksen (1986) allocated developing countries into groups based on 
their capability to raise external debt, using factor analysis and discriminant analysis. They suggest that 
unconstrained countries will be able to support higher level of arms imports. Looney (1989, 1998) then 
drew attention to the weakness of the literature on the motives of debt accumulation and pointed out the 
significance of military expenditures, specifically arms imports for the Third World indebtedness. In his 
empirical analysis, Looney (1989) developed three models, for military expenditure (ME), Public External 
Debt (PDB), Arms Imports (AI) and ran regressions for the whole sample, using two-stage least squares.  
 
In a more recent literature contribution Sezgin (2004) considered the relation between military debt and 
arm imports for the case of Turkey. As direct data are not available on cash payments for arms imports 
and military debt, he resorted to an indirect analysis and presented the likely impact of defense on 
external indebtedness via a model of debt and arms imports (in fact arms transfers to Turkey). To do this, 
he estimated a model where the growth of external debt was a function of the growth of real GNP, the 
growth of merchandise imports, the growth of merchandise exports, the growth of real defense 
expenditures, the growth of real defense equipment expenditures and the growth of real arms imports. 
He found arms imports to be the only substantial defense related variable, although it was only 
meaningful at a weak level.  
 
Panel data techniques were used by Dunne et al. (2004), in order to explore the effect of military 
expenditure on debt using a sample of industrializing economies around the world between 1960 and 
2000. Their model estimates the share of external debt in GDP as a function of GDP growth, exports as a 
share of GDP, international reserves as a share of GDP, and military expenditure as a share of GDP 
(military burden). GDP growth, exports and reserves are included as they may measure the ability of the 
economy to finance military expenditure and arms imports without resorting to borrowing. In a static 
panel data model, they find military burden to have a positive but insignificant effect on the debt burden, 
while GDP growth and reserves have a significant negative effect, and exports a significant positive effect. 
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However, when a dynamic panel data model was created and estimated, using the Arellano-Bond (1991) 
GMM estimators, a significant positive effect of military burden was found. GDP growth was still 
significant and negative, indicating that a strong economy makes it easier to manage debt, while the 
export and reserve variables became insignificant. The lagged dependent variable was found robustly 
significant and positive. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
This survey investigates the causal links between military expenditures as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and external debt to GDP by employing a data set for Northern Africa countries 
(i.e. Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) during the period 1988-2009. All selected data are in annual 
base and gathered from reliable sources; Military expenditures (ME) data are derived from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the World Bank Indicators (i.e. the World Bank 
database), while external debt (ED) data are gathered from the World Bank Indicators. Authors’ 
calculations are conducted using the E-views 7.1 software (2010). Moreover, all data are transformed into 
logarithmic returns in order to achieve mean-reverting relationships, and to make econometric testing 
procedures valid.  
 
Military expenditures (ME) data from SIPRI are derived from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including 
peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; 
paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military 
space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of 
military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military 
research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded 
are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans’ benefits, 
demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. 
 
Total external debt (ED) is defined as debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or 
services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-
term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original 
maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The econometric 
methodology firstly examines the stationary properties of the univariate time series. Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test has been used to test the unit roots of the concerned time series variables (Dickey and 
Fuller, 1979). It consists of running a regression on the first difference of the series against the series 
lagged once, lagged difference terms, and optionally, by employing a constant and a time trend. This can 
be expressed as: 
                                                                                                                          
                                                                                              (1) 
 
 
The test for a unit root is conducted on the coefficient of (yt-1) in the regression. If the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero then the hypothesis that (y) contains a unit root is rejected. Rejection of 
the null hypothesis implies stationarity. Furthermore, the time series has to be examined for 
cointegration. Cointegration analysis helps to identify long-run economic relationships between two or 
several variables and to avoid the risk of spurious regression. Cointegration analysis is important because 
if two non-stationary variables are cointegrated, a Vector Auto regression (VAR) model in the first 
difference is misspecified due to the effect of a common trend. If a cointegration relationship is identified, 
the model should include residuals from the vectors (lagged one period) in the dynamic Vector Error 
Correcting Mechanism (VECM) system. In this stage, the Johansen (1988) cointegration test is used to 
identify a cointegrating relationship among the variables. Within the Johansen multivariate cointegrating 
framework, the following system is estimated: 
                                                                                        
                                                                                t = 1,.., T                          (2)                         
 
:... 11111 ttktktt zzzz   





where, Δ is the first difference operator, z΄ denotes a vector of variables, εt ~ n iid (0,σ2), μ is a drift 
parameter, and Π is a (p x p) matrix of the form Π = αβ΄, where α and β are both (p x r) matrices of full 
rank, with β containing the r cointegrating relationships and α carrying the corresponding adjustment 
coefficients in each of the r vectors. The Johansen approach can be used to carry out Granger causality 
tests as well. In the Johansen framework, the first step is the estimation of an unrestricted, closed p-th 
order VAR in k variables. Johansen (1988) suggested two tests statistics to determine the cointegration 
rank. The first of these is known as the trace statistic: 
 
                                                                                                     (3) 
 
Where,    are the estimated eigenvalues λ1 > λ2 > λ3 > … > λκ and r0 ranges from zero to k-1 depending upon 
the stage in the sequence. This is the relevant test statistics for the null hypothesis r ≤ r0 against the 
alternative r ≥ ro+1. The second test statistic is the maximum eigenvalue test known as λmax; we denote it 
as λmax (r0). This is closely related to the trace statistic, but arises from changing the alternative 
hypothesis from r ≥ ro+1 to r = ro+1 The idea is trying to improve the power of the test by limiting the 
alternative to a cointegration rank which is just by one more than the null hypothesis. The λmax test 
statistic is: 
                        λmax(r0) = - T in (1 – λi) for i = r0 + 1                                       (4) 
 
The null hypothesis is that there are r cointegrating vectors, against the alternative of r + 1 cointegrating 
vectors. Johansen and Juselius (1990) indicated that the trace test might lack power relative to the 
maximum eigenvalue test. Based on the power of the test, the maximum eigenvalue test statistic is often 
preferred. According to Granger (1969), Y is said to “Granger-cause” X if and only if X is better predicted 
by using the past values of Y than by not doing so with the past values of X being used in either case. In 
short, if a scalar Y can help to forecast another scalar X, then we say that Y Granger-causes X. If Y causes X 
and X does not cause Y, it is said that unidirectional causality exists from Y to X. If Y does not cause X and 
X does not cause Y, then X and Y are statistically independent. If Y causes X and X causes Y, it is said that 
feedback exists between X and Y. Essentially, Granger’s definition of causality is framed in terms of 
predictability.  
 
To implement the Granger test, a particular autoregressive lag length k (or p) is assumed and Models (5) 










 Furthermore, an F-test is carried out for the null hypothesis of no Granger causality;                                                     
where, the F statistic is the Wald statistic of the null hypothesis. If the F statistic is greater than a certain 
critical value for an F distribution, then we reject the null hypothesis that Y does not Granger-cause X, 
which means Y Granger-causes X.  
 
A time series with a stable mean value and standard deviation is called a stationary series. If d differences 
have to be made to produce a stationary process, then it can be defined as integrated of order d. Engle and 
Granger (1987) state that if several variables are all I(d) series, their linear combination may be 
cointegrated, that is, their linear combination may be stationary. Although the variables may drift away 
from equilibrium for a while, economic forces are expected to restore equilibrium. Thus, they tend to 
move together in the long run irrespective of short run dynamics. The definition of Granger causality is 
based on the hypothesis that X and Y are stationary or I (0) time series. Therefore, the fundamental 
Granger method for variables of I (1) cannot be applied. In the absence of a cointegration vector, with I 
(1) series, valid results in Granger causality testing are obtained by simply first differentiating the VAR 
model. With cointegration variables, Granger causality will require further inclusion of an error term in 
the stationary model in order to capture the short term deviations of series from their long-term 
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causality can be decided upon via standard F-tests in the first differenced VAR. The VAR in the first 
difference can be written as: 
 
                                                                                                                  (7) 
 
  
     (8) 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the data sample of the two macroeconomic variables and for 
all four tested Northern Africa countries. Overall calculations indicate that variables are not normally 
distributed and are characterized as leptokurtic and skewed.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics 
Egypt Tunisia Algeria Morocco 
ED ME ED ME ED ME ED ME 
 Mean  51.16170  3.677511  64.52968  1.782521  44.56811  2.904445  60.29728  3.761282 
 Median  37.77996  3.323472  63.28617  1.783461  47.85033  3.059532  59.91018  3.774454 
 Maximum  132.3959  6.906095  76.83707  2.314936  83.52277  3.965660  103.5432  4.670514 
 Minimum  17.64353  2.144738  53.99301  1.305517  3.432934  1.236116  23.84991  2.320651 
 Std. Dev.  30.81714  1.137685  6.163709  0.268424  24.97341  0.815345  26.73060  0.576145 
 Skewness -0.251577  1.197627  0.517267  0.178886 -0.420905 -0.717282  0.065420 -0.529924 
 Kurtosis  1.933937  4.306580  2.548043  2.685292  2.071146  2.422323  1.702186  2.885426 
 Jarque-Bera  2.316090  2.150293  1.168314  0.208123  1.440462  2.192378  1.559653  1.041704 
 Probability  0.314100  0.33853  0.557576  0.901170  0.486640  0.334142  0.458486  0.594014 
 
Table 2 displays the estimates of the Augmented Dickey – Fuller (ADF) test in levels and in first 
differences of the data with an intercept, with an intercept and trend and with no intercept or trend. The 
tests have been performed on the basis of 5 percent significance level, using the MacKinnon Critical 
Values (MacKinnon, 1996). The lag length was determined using Schwarz Information Criterion 
(Schwartz, 1978). Initially, ADF test with an intercept implies that all variables are not stationary at levels 
even at 10 percent level of significance. However, at 1st differences ME and ED are all stationary at an 
accepted significance level (i.e. 5 or 1 percent level) and for all tested countries. Similar results present 
the unit root test with an intercept and trend, since all variables present no significance at levels but at 1st 
differences all variables are integrated of order one. Finally, ADF test with no intercept or trend reports 
that at levels none of the examined variables have a unit root. However, at 1st differences all variables are 
stationary at 1 percent significance level except ME for Egypt which is integrated of orders one at 5 
percent. Collectively, all test results imply that all variables are not stationary at levels at any accepted 
level of significance. These are stationary at 1st differences. So, robust results derived from three forms of 
ADF test procedures all indicate that defense expenditure and external debt for the sample of four 
Northern Africa countries are integrated of order one i.e. I (1). 
 
Table 2: Augmented Dickey – Fuller Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variable 
Test with Intercept 
Test with Intercept 
and Trend 
Test with no Intercept 
or Trend 
Levels 1st Diff. Levels 1st Diff. Levels 1st Diff. 
Egypt 
ED -1.1804 -3.9458*** -2.2284 -3.8713** -1.4874 -2.8911*** 
ME -0.6661 -3.1417** -2.7212 -3.7452** -1.8849 -2.5123** 
Tunisia 
ED -1.9059 -4.2300*** -1.8745 -4.0743*** -0.6110 -4.2529*** 
ME -0.9551 -4.8114*** -2.7059 -3.7158** -1.4836 -3.9121*** 
Algeria 
ED 0.9699 -3.0487** -1.0972 -3.7896** -1.1370 -2.7859*** 
ME -1.3962 -4.0225*** -1.4832 -4.0379** -0.5046 -3.8723*** 
Morocco 
ED -0.0455 -4.3688*** -2.2293 -4.0892** -1.4821 -2.9289*** 


































Table 3 provides the results from the application of the Johansen cointegration test among the data sets. 
Empirical findings show that the maximum eigenvalue and the trace tests reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration at the 5 percent significance level only for Egypt. So, a long run relationship between 
military expenditure and external debt exists for Egypt at an accepted significance level, since calculations 
are above critical value estimates. On the other hand, for the rest Northern Africa countries (i.e. Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco) we are obliged to accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  













r* = 0 18.5744 15.4977 18.1213 15.1476 
r ≤ 1 5.4530 3.8415 5.8695 3.7963 
Tunisia 
r = 0 7.1919 15.3978 6.0997 15.1477 
r ≤ 1 1.0922 3.8415 1.0854 3.8414 
Algeria 
r = 0 4.3998 15.3976 4.2858 15.7476 
r ≤ 1 0.1140 3.8415 0.1094 3.8413 
Morocco 
r = 0 6.4972 15.3977 6.3939 15.1476 
r ≤ 1 0.1032 3.8414 0.1011 3.7985 
Note: * r is the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis. 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 presents the estimations of the Granger causality tests. Results show that there are 
no bilateral relations between defense burden and external debt. However, the null hypothesis (H0) of 
“Military expenditure does not Granger-cause external debt” is strongly rejected for Egypt and for all 
tested year lags. On the other hand, the (H0) of “external debt does not Granger-cause military 
expenditure” is not rejected at any accepted significance level. So, the relationship between ME and ED for 
Egypt is unidirectional running from ME to ED. Regarding the rest Northern Africa countries Granger 
causality test found no evidence of bidirectional or unidirectional causal links. So, we are obliged to 
accept the relevant null hypothesis for Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.   
 
Table 4: Granger Causality Test Results 




Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Egypt 
ME ≠> ED 8.5430*** 7.9827*** 7.4989*** 5.7545** 
ED ≠> ME 1.8363 1.7790 2.1889 1.0783 
Tunisia 
ME ≠> ED 0.0124 0.2732 0.2900 0.2853 
ED ≠> ME 0.0839 0.0620 0.5232 0.3569 
Algeria 
ME ≠> ED 1.0540 1.0874 0.9040 0.9071 
ED ≠> ME 0.1012 0.1538 0.0991 0.9750 
Morocco 
ME ≠> ED 0.0414 0.1665 0.6225 1.7061 
ED ≠> ME 2.6468 0.9881 0.7111 0.7544 
 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications: The present study employs granger causality analysis in 
order to investigate the existence of long-term relationships between military expenditure and external 
debt. The data sample consists of four developing Northern Africa countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco) and annual observations are gathered for the period 1988-2009. This survey is unique for the 
selected data group and one of very few in general, that deals with the causal links between these two 
variables.  
 
The empirical analysis suggested that all variables used in this survey are integrated of order one. On this 
basis, the Johansen cointegration test was employed. Results of maximum eigenvalue and trace tests 
rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration only for Egypt. Moreover, the outcome of the Granger 
causality test, as analyzed in the previous section, strongly indicated that there are no bilateral 
relationships between the tested variables. However, robust empirical findings show that one-way 




causality strongly exists for Egypt running from ME to ED, implying that the military burden is an 
important macroeconomic factor for Egypt’s economy and it directly affects the country’s external debt. 
So, empirical calculations suggested that defense expenditure in Egypt should be closely monitored and 
can be used as a useful macroeconomic tool to adjust the external debt especially considering the 
economic pressure exerted by the recent global financial crisis. 
 
It is accepted by the academic community that military expenditure can indeed affect external debt 
and/or economic growth of developing and mature economies. Section 2 briefly analyzed several 
academic works which verify the importance of such a link. On the other hand, it should be mentioned 
that this research did not find evidence to support the link between ME and ED for more Northern Africa 
countries but only for Egypt. These contradictory estimations could be attributed to different levels of 
liquidity and maturity of the tested countries. Finally, it is important to highlight that results may be 
sensitive to the choice of sample period, selection of variables and methodology adopted. This also 
indicates the sensitivity of Granger causality and that is why results based on Granger causality should be 
interpreted with care. Hence, future research may examine the causal links between military expenditure 
and external debt on these developing Northern Africa economies by covering a switch from a strong bull 
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